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COMMENTS
BRINGING BLOGGERS INTO THE JOURNALISTIC
PRIVILEGE FOLD
Nathan Fennessy'
Consider a situation in which Matt Drudge was subpoenaed by the
attorney general of New York to appear before a grand jury concerning
the source of information printed on Drudge's website.' The information
claimed that the governor had been accepting hundreds of thousands of
dollars in gifts in return for handing out no-bid contracts to a large
construction firm. The source of the information was an employee of the
company who had been forced to sign off on the "expenditures" by her
boss but wished to remain anonymous. In addition to Matt Drudge, the
attorney general also subpoenaed a columnist for the New York Times,
an investigative journalist for WABC-TV, and a soccer mom in
Poughkeepsie who operates a website on government corruption.
One might think that these individuals would have some protection
under the Freedom of the Press Clause of the First Amendment from
revealing information given in confidence.2 New York's media shield law
may also protect them from revealing their confidential sources.'
' J.D. Candidate, May 2007, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author wishes to thank his Note and Comment Editor, Daniel Marcinak, for his
guidance through the writing process. The author would also like to thank Caitlin Davitt
for her love, support, and editing expertise.
1. See Drudge Report, http://www.drudgereport.com (last visited June 26, 2006)
(soliciting news tips and guaranteeing anonymity).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
3. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1992). The law provides:
(b) Exemption of professional journalists and newscasters from contempt:
Absolute protection for confidential news. Notwithstanding the provisions of
any general or specific law to the contrary, no professional journalist or
newscaster presently or having previously been employed or otherwise
associated with any newspaper, magazine, news agency, press association, wire
service, radio or television transmission station or network or other professional
medium of communicating news or information to the public shall be adjudged in
contempt by any court in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding, or by
the legislature or other body having contempt powers, nor shall a grand jury seek
to have a journalist or newscaster held in contempt by any court, legislature or
other body having contempt powers for refusing or failing to disclose any news
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However, even though all of these individuals received the information
they published from the same source, the more likely scenario is that the
soccer mom and possibly Drudge would be unable to prevent the
attorney general from dragging them before the grand jury. The
problem for the soccer mom would be that the New York statute and
other state statutes,5 as well as the federal common law,6 have not
considered what protection, if any, should be given to the twenty-first
century version of the "lonefly] pamphleteer.,
7
Unlike other groups claiming a privilege, journalists deserve special
protection from revealing their confidential sources because they
generally are subpoenaed in cases involving "'political' crimes."8  The
recent Valerie Plame saga9 is just another episode in a long series of cases
obtained or received in confidence or the identity of the source of any such news
coming into such person's possession in the course of gathering or obtaining
news for publication or to be published in a newspaper, magazine, or for
broadcast by a radio or television transmission station or network or for public
dissemination by any other professional medium or agency which has as one of
its main functions the dissemination of news to the public, by which such person
is professionally employed or otherwise associated in a news gathering capacity
notwithstanding that the material or identity of a source of such material or
related material gathered by a person described above performing a function
described above is or is not highly relevant to a particular inquiry of government
and notwithstanding that the information was not solicited by the journalist or
newscaster prior to disclosure to such person.
Id. § 79-h(b).
4. See infra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (West 2000).
6. In this sense, "federal common law" refers not to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), but to the development of privileges under the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 501 ("Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of
the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law.").
7. See Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1256, 1272 (2005); infra Part IIA-B.
8. Mark Neubauer, Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case
for a Federal Shield Law, 24 UCLA L. REV. 160, 161 (1976).
9. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 965-68 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005). United States District Court Judge Thomas F. Hogan
denied Time Magazine reporter Matthew Cooper's motion to quash a subpoena to testify
before a grand jury regarding the source who revealed Valerie Plame's status as a CIA
agent. See In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26, 32 (D.D.C. 2004).
Cooper wrote an article published on Time's website that revealed that government
officials had indicated Ms. Plame was a CIA official. In Re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller,
1060 [Vol. 55:1059
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in which the government has subpoenaed reporters in a political battle to
obtain evidence of "radical [political] activity and political corruption."'
Unfortunately, the Plame saga demonstrated the reluctance of the
federal judiciary to provide protection for members of the traditional
media from being used by the government, including administrative
agencies and overzealous prosecutors." If society wants the press to
continue to play the important role that the Supreme Court has long
recognized in our democratic system,'2 society must create a workable
framework to protect journalists from being compelled to disclose their
confidential sources.
Protecting journalists from being forced to reveal their confidential
sources poses new problems as, increasingly, Americans are turning away
from the network news and morning newspaper as sources of
information and turning toward the Internet and blogs.'3 As America
turns to the "new media" for its information, the law should extend the
protections granted to the established media to the "journalists" of the
new media. 14 The problem for courts and legislatures will be determining
397 F.3d at 966. Miller never actually published an article including this information, but
was held in contempt for failing to comply with a subpoena to testify before the grand
jury. Id. at 967.
10. Neubauer, supra note 8, at 161; see discussion infra Part I.A.1-2.
11. See Bruce S. Rosen, Is the Reporter's Privilege a Barometer of Free Speech's
Health in 2005?, N.J. LAW. MAG., Apr. 2005, at 30, 31.
12. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726 n.1 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("We have often described the process of informing the public as the core purpose of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and a free press."); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,
539 (1965) ("The free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in
governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees and
generally informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences...").
13. See Steven Levy, Will the Blogs Kill Old Media?, NEWSWEEK, May 20, 2002, at
52. Blog is a shortened form of a "web log." Louise Kehoe, Bloggers Slip the Surly Bonds
of Print: Louise Kehoe Examines the Rise to Prominence of Web Logs-An Anarchic Form
of Online Journalism, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 6/Apr. 7, 2002, at 11. A blogger is
someone who posts a web log. Id. Originally, blogs were only "for technically savvy
individuals to help others unearth useful internet sites." Paul S. Gutman, Comment, Say
What?: Blogging and Employment Law in Conflict, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 145, 145
(2003). The blog was used to direct people around the Internet in the days before efficient
search engines. Id. Comments sometimes accompanied the links to other web sites to
help steer people to helpful or interesting Internet sites. Id. Today, the blog has become
the equivalent of an online diary or the platform upon which a person can express his
views to the world. Id. at 146. The Pew Internet Project found that "[i]n 2004 ... blog
traffic skyrocketed, increasing by 58 percent in a year when overall net traffic was up only
6 percent." Lincoln Caplan, Blawgs, LEGAL AFF., May/June 2005, at 1, available at WL
2005-JUN Legal Aff. 1. Despite the huge increase in blog traffic, "62 percent of Internet
users in the Pew survey said they had never heard of blogs." Id.
14. See David McGowan, Response, Approximately Speech, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1416,
1434-36 (2005) (contending that a privilege that is limited only to traditional institutions
would disadvantage those using new institutions).
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who deserves protection. 5 Because of the increased difficulty in deciding
who qualifies for the privilege, "some commentators predict an imminent
end of special protections for the press and a merger of the First
Amendment's Free Speech and Free Press Clauses."'6  While some
commentators relish the press' loss of special protections, 7 merging the
two clauses may result in less First Amendment protection for
18
everyone.
One commentator has suggested that rather than defining what is news
or who is a journalist, the law should extend the privilege to the
journalistic process. " However, if courts are unable to tackle the tough
questions of differentiating between the New York Times reporter and
the rumor-mongering blogger, courts are less likely to grant any
protection to an individual claiming a privilege to protect confidential
sources. 0 If anyone posting information on the Internet can claim to be a
journalist, a journalistic privilege to provide those actually posting
newsworthy information with special protection from compelled
15. See Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative
Proposal Limiting the Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of
Protection for Sources and Information, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 97, 100-01 (2002)
(suggesting the increase in nontraditional news providers will make it increasingly difficult
for judges to determine who is a journalist).
16. Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to
Protect the Journalist's Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOuS. L. REV.
1371, 1378 (2003) ("When everyone can be a member, the club can no longer promise
special treatment." (citing David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429,
430-35 (2002) and Mike Godwin, Who's a Journalist?-II- Welcome the New Journalists on
the Internet, MEDIA STUD. J., Spring/Summer 1999, at 38,38-39)).
17. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 16, at 455-57 (questioning whether it is
appropriate in this new world of "interconnected media conglomerates" to extend special
protections to journalists on the basis that "'media corporations differ significantly from
other corporations in that their resources are devoted to the collection of information and
its dissemination to the public"' (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 667 (1990))).
18. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 16, at 1378.
19. See id. at 1375-76.
20. See Schauer, supra note 7, at 1272. Schauer suggests that part of the Supreme
Court's reluctance in this area is due to "its lack of knowledge of new and rapidly changing
technologies." Id. at 1266. Schauer argues that if the Court is going to use
its own knowledge and . . . research to opine about the fundamental nature of
golf, the frequency of flawed ballots, and the behavior of the press in the face of
potential legal liability, for example-there should be little special concern if that
same Court is willing to opine about the differences-or nondifferences-
between journalists and bloggers.
Id. at 1266-67 (footnotes omitted). But see Eugene Volokh, Op-Ed, You Can Blog, But
You Can't Hide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at A39 (arguing that any privilege for
journalists should be the same, regardless of whether they are professional or amateur and
regardless of whether they use old media or new media to publish their information).
[Vol. 55:10591062
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disclosure is unlikely. 2 The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
will still protect the amateur blogger who wants to post information.22
However, it is still important that the law provide the same protection
that the traditional media enjoys for those individuals who are actively
engaged in gathering information that constitutes news for public
dissemination exclusively through websites.23
This Comment begins by examining the history of the reporter's
privilege prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes,24
which rejected a First Amendment privilege allowing reporters to protect
their sources when called before a grand jury. Then, this Comment
discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg and how the circuit
courts of appeals have interpreted that decision to create a qualified
privilege. Next, this Comment explores how states have enacted their
own shield laws to protect journalists. This Comment addresses the
nature of the privilege created by state laws, who they protect, and how
the laws define journalists. This Comment then explores whether
bloggers may already be covered under the qualified privilege at the
federal level and under some state shield laws. Finally, this Comment
proposes that a federal privilege be created, expressly incorporating
bloggers who can qualify as journalists. This Comment concludes that
bloggers who gather "news" to be disseminated to the public and who
are professionally affiliated with an online news service or website should
be protected as journalists under the First Amendment.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE JOURNALISTIC PRIVILEGE
A. The Nature of the Journalistic Privilege at the Federal Level
1. No Recognized Journalistic Privilege Before Branzburg
The first reported media shield case dates back to 1848.25 A reporter
for the New York Herald, John Nugent, passed along a copy of the treaty
to end the Mexican-American War, including proposed amendments by
the Senate, to his editor for publication while the United States Senate
21. See Berger, supra note 16, at 1378.
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. See Dale Carpenter, Response, The Value of Institutions and the Values of Free
Speech, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1407, 1411 (2005) (concluding that favoring individuals
connected to traditional media with special protections under the First Amendment will
create a bias favoring "mainstream institutions and ideas at the expense of 'the poorly
financed causes of little people."' (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146
(1943))).
24. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
25. Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471 (D.C. Cir. 1848) (No. 10, 375); Neubauer, supra
note 8, at 161.
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26was in a secret session. When the Senate learned what had happened, it
subpoenaed Nugent so it could find out who provided him a copy of the
confidential draft.2 7 When Nugent refused to answer the Senate's
questions, he was thrown in jail for contempt of Congress.28 The D.C.
Circuit denied Nugent's writ of habeas corpus, holding that it had no
jurisdiction over the action because "the senate of the United States has
power, when acting in a case within its jurisdiction, to punish all
contempts of its authority.,
29
Nine years later, James Simonton, a correspondent for the New York
Daily Times, met the same fate as Nugent.0 Simonton had alleged that
members of the House of Representatives had taken bribes for their
votes on land grant bills." He was brought before a House committee to
"show cause why he should not be proceeded against by the House as in
contempt. 3 2  When Simonton's responses proved unsatisfactory, the
committee resolved that "he be held in custody by the Sergeant-at-Arms
until he make answer to said questions, or until the further order of the
House. 3 3 Despite the fact that the committee investigation subsequently
showed that members had taken bribes, Simonton was "placed in the
custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms for the remainder of the session.,
34
While these isolated events were noteworthy and spawned some action
on the state level,35 they failed to motivate the Congress to take any
36
action on proposed bills calling for a reporter's privilege. It was not
until the late 1960s, during the Nixon administration, that claims for a
privilege dramatically increased. 37  The Nixon administration began
26. Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. at 471-72; Neubauer, supra note 8, at 161.
27. Neubauer, supra note 8, at 161.
28. Id.; see also Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. at 471-72.
29. Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. at 483.
30. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 235
(1974).
31. Id.
32. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 411 (1857).
33. Id. at 412.
34. Ervin, supra note 30, at 235.
35. See discussion infra Part I.B.
36. See Ervin, supra note 30, at 241 n.23 (1973). The first bill calling for a reporter's
privilege was introduced by Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas on October 30, 1929. Id.;
see also 71 CONG. REC. 5832 (1929). The Senate failed to take any action on the bill.
Ervin, supra note 30, at 241 n.23 (1973).
37. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 523 n.500 ("In the first two-and-one-half years of
the Nixon administration, nearly two hundred subpoenas were served on reporters and
news organizations, far more than had been served in all previous administrations.")
(citing JOHN J. WATKINS, THE MASS MEDIA AND THE LAW 301-02 (1990)); see also
Neubauer, supra note 8, at 162 & n.13 ("[Diuring the first two and one-half years of the
Nixon administration ... [s]ome 124 subpoenas were served on... CBS [and] NBC .... ).
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subpoenaing reporters to obtain information about leftist militants. The
administration viewed the press as an investigative arm of the
government that was useful for cracking down on the subversive
activities of leftists.3 9 The issue of a journalist's privilege finally came to
the judiciary's attention in 1972 with the Supreme Court's decision to
hear three cases involving journalists who claimed First Amendment
protection when called to appear before a grand jury.4
2. Branzburg Majority Finds No Constitutional Privilege Protecting
Journalist's Confidential Sources
Branzburg v. Hayes arrived before the Supreme Court as part of a
series of cases in state and federal courts concerning journalists who had
observed criminal conduct and who had been subpoenaed to testify
before grand juries about what they observed.4' The Kentucky Court of
Appeals held in Branzburg v. Pound42 that Kentucky's media shield law
did not permit a journalist to refuse to testify about events that he
personally witnessed, or the identity of those persons that he personally
observed. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, held in Caldwell v.
38. See Neubauer, supra note 8, at 162-63 (quoting Fred Graham, Mitchell Moves to
Cool Disputes with Press, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1970, at 9). While delivering a speech to
the American Bar Association House of Delegates in 1970, then-Attorney General John
Mitchell emphasized the importance of using the press to aid government investigations:
"'[O]ccasionally, we have newsmen and photographers who are experts in a case we are
investigating and who may have more information than the government has-factual
information and photographs which the government finds difficult, if not impossible, to
obtain through its own investigatory agencies."' Id. (quoting Honorable John N. Mitchell,
Attorney General of the United States, Address at the American Bar Association House
of Delegates (Aug. 10, 1970)).
39. See id. at 163.
40. Ervin, supra note 30, at 241; see also United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665
(1972); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); In re Pappas, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
41. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1082 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408 U.S. 665
(1972); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970), affd sub nom.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 298 (Mass. 1971),
affd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The petitioner, Branzburg, a staff reporter for Louisville's
Courier-Journal newspaper, appealed two decisions of the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
408 U.S. at 667. Branzburg had written two articles, one "detail[ing] his observations of
two young residents.., synthesizing hashish from marihuana." Id.
42. 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970), aff d sub nor. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665 (1972).
43. Branzburg, 461 S.W.2d at 348; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100
(LexisNexis 2005) ("No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceeding or
trial before any court, or before any grand or petit jury, or before the presiding officer of
any tribunal, or his agent or agents, or before the General Assembly, or any committee
thereof, or before any city or county legislative body, or any committee thereof, or
elsewhere, the source of any information procured or obtained by him, and published in a
newspaper or by a radio or television broadcasting station by which he is engaged or
employed, or with which he is connected.").
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United States44 that compelling a New York Times journalist to testify
before a grand jury about the aims, purposes, and goals of Black Panther
Party members he covered was an infringement on the journalist's FirstS 41
Amendment rights. In addition, the Supreme Judicial Court of
41Massachusetts held in In re Pappas that a television newsman-
photographer did not have a constitutional privilege to refuse to divulge
information he observed while on assignment in and around a Black
Panther headquarters. 47 The court concluded that "[t]he obligation of
newsmen ... is that of every citizen ... to appear when summoned, with
relevant written or other material when required, and to answer relevant
and reasonable inquiries.,
48
Writing for a five-four majority in Branzburg, Justice White found that
reporters were not entitled to any privilege beyond that of an ordinary
citizen when it comes to appearing before a grand jury to answer
questions concerning the investigation of a crime.4' The Court rejected
the argument that forcing newsmen to testify before grand juries would
deter future informers from providing information to journalists.0 The
majority believed that creating a constitutional privilege for journalists
would be problematic because the Court would be forced to determine
who qualified for the privilege on a case-by-case basis. 1 Justice White
44. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
45. Id. at 1083 n.2, 1089.
46. 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), affd, 408 U.S 665 (1972).
47. Id. at 298, 304.
48. Id. at 303.
49. 408 U.S. at 682, 690. Justice White announced that:
The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury
subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an
investigation into the commission of crime. Citizens generally are not
constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoenas; and neither the First
Amendment nor any other constitutional provision protects the average citizen
from disclosing to a grand jury information he has received in confidence.
Id. at 682.
50. See id. at 693. Justice White found that "the evidence fails to demonstrate that
there would be a significant constriction of the flow of news to the public if this Court
reaffirms the prior common-law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial
obligations of newsmen." Id. But see id. at 731 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen
governmental officials possess an unchecked power to compel newsmen to disclose
information received in confidence, sources will clearly be deterred from giving
information, and reporters will clearly be deterred from publishing it, because uncertainty
about exercise of the power will lead to 'self-censorship.' The uncertainty arises, of
course, because the judiciary has traditionally imposed virtually no limitations on the
grand jury's broad investigatory powers.") (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 703-05 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Categorizing newsmen would create a
"questionable procedure" because liberty of the press had traditionally been the right of
"the lonely pamphleteer" as much as the right of the "metropolitan publisher." Id. at 704.
But see Schauer, supra note 7, at 1264 ("It is ... surprising and anomalous that the same
1066 [Vol. 55:1059
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feared that "[b]y affording a privilege to some organs of communication
but not to others, courts would inevitably be discriminating on the basis
of content.
'5 2
Nonetheless, the Court did not find that reporters lacked all First
Amendment protection when called to testify before a grand jury.53
Rather, the First Amendment would protect them in limited
circumstances in which the grand jury investigation was not conducted in
good faith . However, without any bad faith allegations, Justice White
perceived the activities in the three cases as legitimate exercises of the
grand jury function.55 The Court noted that the Attorney General of the
United States had announced a set of guidelines for subpoenaing
members of the media and issued a copy of the guidelines to all United
56States Attorneys. Justice White forecast that the guidelines "may prove
wholly sufficient to resolve the bulk of disagreements and controversies
between press and federal officials.""T
3. Justice Powell's Concurrence and Justice Stewart's Dissent
Justice Powell's 58 "enigmatic concurring opinion"5 9 has provided an
opportunity for lower courts to chip away at the Branzburg holding.6
While ostensibly joining the majority and providing the crucial fifth vote,
Justice Powell's "brief statement" emphasizing the "limited nature of the
Court's holding, 6' has produced inconsistency among the circuit courts.
6 2
courts that have been quite willing to distinguish the obscene from the indecent and the
commercial from the noncommercial have been far less willing to distinguish media from
nonmedia, individual speakers from magazine publishers, adult theaters from the Internet,
and so on throughout most of the doctrinal structure of First Amendment decision
making.").
52. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 705 n.40.
53. See id. at 707-08.
54. Id. ("Official harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law
enforcement but to disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news sources would have no
justification.").
55. See id. at 686-88.
56. Id. at 707 n.41. The guidelines, which are still in effect, call for the prosecutor to
balance "the public's interest in the free dissemination of ideas... and the public's interest
in effective law enforcement." 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2004). The prosecutor should take all
reasonable steps "to obtain [the] information from alternative sources" and should pursue
"negotiations with the media" when he contemplates subpoenaing a member of the media.
Id. Subpoenas are limited to those instances when the information is essential and must
be directed at limited subject matter. Id.
57. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707.
58. Id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
60. In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2004).
61. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
62. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 16, at 1389 & n.91. As Berger quoted:
1067
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Justice Powell suggested that a journalist's ability to quash a subpoena
was not limited to bad faith investigations, but also included situations
where the journalist was "called upon to give information bearing only a
remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if
he has some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates
confidential source relationships without a legitimate need of law
. ,,61
enforcement. Justice Powell called for such claims of privilege to be
balanced against the need for the evidence on a case-by-case basis.64 As a
result, courts have interpreted Justice Powell's concurrence and Justice
Stewart's dissent as creating a qualified privilege for journalists.65 Only
the Sixth Circuit has accepted the Branzburg holding that no reporter's
66privilege exists. Most circuits have adopted the language of Justice
Powell's opinion, calling for a case-by-case balancing of the journalists'
interest in claiming a privilege and the public's interest in "relevant
testimony with respect to criminal conduct.
6 7
Justice Stewart's dissent has provided a means to balance the interests
at stake.68 To force a reporter to testify before a grand jury, the
government must demonstrate: (1) "there is probable cause to believe
that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a specific
probable violation of law"; (2) "information sought cannot be obtained
The majority rejected the claim of a reporter's testimonial privilege; Justice
Powell seemingly recognized it. The majority rejected the call for a case-by-case,
conditional balancing of interests; Justice Powell mandated it. The majority
indicated that a journalist could quash a subpoena only by showing that it was
issued in bad faith; Justice Powell extended the zone to good-faith subpoenas
seeking "remote and tenuous" information ... Yet Justice Powell joined the
majority opinion. Indeed, his vote made it the majority opinion.
Id. at 1389 (quoting Steven Bates, The Reporter's Privilege: Then and Now 1, 6-7 (2000)
(Research Paper No. R-23, The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public
Policy, Harvard University).
63. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Titan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. (In re Madden), 151 F.3d
125, 128-30 (3d Cir. 1998); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Long (In re Shain), 978 F.2d 850, 852-53 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v.
LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (1st Cir. 1988); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811
F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983).
66. See Storer Commc'ns, Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d
580, 584 (6th Cir. 1987) (declining to join other circuits in creating a qualified privilege for
journalists).
67. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring); see, e.g., Titan Sports, Inc.,
151 F.3d at 128-29; United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998); Shoen, 5 F.3d
at 1292-93; Long, 978 F.2d at 852; LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d at 1181-82; von Bulow,
811 F.2d at 142; United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986).
68. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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by means less destructive of First Amendment rights"; and (3) there is a
"compelling and overriding interest in the information."'6 9
Justice Stewart, however, did not provide a means for determining who
could qualify as a journalist under the privilege.7" He did not anticipate
that the Court would have a problem distinguishing between journalists
and non-journalists as did Justice White." Accordingly, it has been left
to the lower courts to determine who qualifies as a journalist."
4. The Creation of a Qualified Privilege by Lower Courts
a. Qualified Privilege in Civil Actions
It did not take long for the lower courts to begin to limit Branzburg.73
Drawing on Justice Powell's comment regarding the "limited nature" of
the Branzburg holding,74 the lower courts began determining that a
common law privilege existed when the facts of the case differed from
69. Id. The federal circuit courts and state courts have adopted similar standards for
determining whether the qualified privilege applies. Compare, e.g., Titan Sports, Inc., 151
F.3d at 128-29, with, e.g., In re Paul, 513 S.E.2d 219, 223 (Ga. 1999). But see United States
v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 711 (Douglas, J. dissenting). Conversely, in one of the
companion cases to Branzburg, United States v. Caldwell, Justice Douglas expressed his
view that the First Amendment provides an absolute privilege for reporters and chastised
the New York Times for taking the position that First Amendment rights should be
balanced against the interests of the government. United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665,
711-13 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas believed "that all of the 'balancing' was
done by those who wrote the Bill of Rights. By casting the First Amendment in absolute
terms, they repudiated the timid, watered-down, emasculated versions of the First
Amendment which both the Government and the New York Times advance[d] in the
case." Id. at 713.
70. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 744 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (referring to the need to
protect "reporters" and "newsman," but providing no definition for these terms).
71. See id. at 705. Justice White was concerned that "[t]he informative function
asserted by representatives of the organized press in the present cases is also performed by
lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists." Id. Thus,
Justice White feared that all of these people may rely on confidential sources and
therefore would be entitled to invoke such a privilege. Id.
72. See, e.g., von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 142 (finding that an individual claiming the
privilege must prove "he is involved in activities traditionally associated with the gathering
and dissemination of news" and that he had the intent at the beginning of the
newsgathering process to disseminate the information); see also Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1293
(extending the journalistic privilege to a professional investigative book author); Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that a documentary
filmmaker is entitled to status as journalist to claim the privilege).
73. See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 780 (2d Cir. 1972) (declining to extend
Branzburg to civil actions).
74. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Branzburg.7 In Baker v. F & F Investment,76 decided just months after
Branzburg, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the
district court judge acted within his discretion in denying a motion to
compel disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources in a class action
suit brought under the Civil Rights Act.77 The Tenth Circuit followed the
781Second Circuit in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., finding that a
defendant in a civil action could not compel a journalist to produce notes
and disclose the content of interviews he conducted with confidential
sources regarding the death of the plaintiff.
9
The Third Circuit continued the trend in Riley v. City of Chester;8°
however, rather than rely on the recent decisions in other circuits, the
court found support in Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.8' The
court determined that the rule's "flexible language was designed to
encompass ... a reporter's privilege."82 The court found support for its
position in the legislative history of the rule, noting that "the privilege
rule was revised to eliminate the proposed specific rules on privileges and
to leave the law of privilege in its current state to be developed by the
federal courts.,
83
The D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit put forth tests for determining
whether a party can compel disclosure of a journalist's confidential
information in a civil action. In Zerilli v. Smith,84 the D.C. Circuit held
that the party seeking the reporter's testimony must demonstrate: (1) the
information is more than "marginally relevant"; (2) the information
"goes to 'the heart of the matter"'; and (3) the "party has exhausted
75. See, e.g., Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 716 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding
qualified privilege for a journalist called as a witness in a civil suit in which neither she nor
her employer had any personal interest).
76. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
77. Id. at 780-81.
78. 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977).
79. Id. at 434, 436-37.
80. 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979).
81. Id. at 713-14.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 714. The court pointed to the legislative history showing the revision was
due to the "'nationwide discussions of the newspaperman's privilege."' Id. (quoting
Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearing on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Spec.
Subcomm. on Reform of Fed. Criminal Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.
5 (1973) (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman)); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 989 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., concurring) (stating that Rule 501
leaves discretion to the courts to determine whether journalistic privilege exists in
particular cases); United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 804 n.25 (1984)
("Rule 501 was adopted precisely because Congress wished to leave privilege questions to
the courts rather than attempt to codify them.").
84. 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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every reasonable alternative source of information. 85 In McGraw-Hill,
Inc. v. Arizona (In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation), the
Second Circuit required the party seeking disclosure to prove: (1) the
information is "highly material and relevant"; (2) "necessary or critical to
the maintenance of the claim"; and (3) "not obtainable from other
available sources."87 Other circuits have embraced some combination of
these two tests.8
b. The Lower Courts Have Defined Who Qualifies as a Journalist by
Looking at the Intent at the Inception of the Newsgathering Process
Despite the widespread acceptance of a qualified privilege by the
circuit courts of appeal, there have been very "few cases that discuss
who, beyond those employed by the traditional media, has status to raise
the journalist's privilege."89 However, the circuit courts of appeals have
not restricted the journalistic privilege to members of the mainstream
media.9° Beginning with Silkwood, some circuits have extended the
privilege to others engaged in the journalistic process.9' The Second
Circuit, for example, set forth the following test to determine whether an
85. Id. at 713 (quoting Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
86. 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982).
87. Id. at 7.
88. See, e.g., Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1296 & n.14 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Once the
privilege is properly invoked, the burden shifts to the requesting party to demonstrate a
sufficiently compelling need for the journalist's materials to overcome the privilege":
specifically, (1) "that the information sought is not obtainable from another source," (2)
"the information sought is relevant, material, and non-cumulative," and (3) the
information "is crucial to the maintenance of plaintiffs' legal claims"); United States v.
Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986) ("[I]nformation may only be compelled
from a reporter claiming privilege if . . . it is highly relevant, necessary to the proper
presentation of the case, and unavailable from other sources."); LaRouche v. Nat'l Broad.
Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986) (applying a "three part test: (1) whether the
information is relevant, (2) whether the information can be obtained by alternative means,
and (3) whether there is a compelling interest in the information"); Miller v.
Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying a "three part test...
(1) is the information relevant, (2) can the information be obtained by alternative means,
and (3) is there a compelling interest in the information?"); Riley, 612 F.2d at 716-17
(requiring that the party seeking disclosure show "relevance and necessity," that "other
means of obtaining the information" have been "exhausted," and that the "material
sought . . . 'provide[s] a source of crucial information going to the heart of"' the claim
(quoting Gulliver's Periodicals Ltd. v. Charles Levy Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197,
1204 (N.D. 11. 1978))).
89. Titan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. (In re Madden), 151 F.3d 125, 128
(3d Cir. 1998).
90. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436 (10th Cir. 1977).
91. See id. at 436 (holding that documentary film-makers could invoke the
protections of the journalist's privilege); Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1293 (holding that a professional
investigative book author qualified as journalist to claim benefit of privilege).
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individual qualified to claim the privilege as a journalist: the individual
must prove "the intent to use [the] material . . . to disseminate
information to the public and that such intent existed at the inception of
the newsgathering process." 92 Both the Ninth Circuit and Third Circuits
have adopted the Second Circuit's test. 93 The Third Circuit has stressed
that "the test [did] not grant status to any person with a manuscript, a
web page or a film. '94 In the Third Circuit, individuals claiming the
privilege have the burden of proving "that they: 1) are engaged in
investigative reporting; 2) are gathering news; and 3) possess the intent at
the inception of the newsgathering process to disseminate this news to
the public." 95
Although courts insist that they look exclusively at the intent of the
individual claiming the privilege,96 the courts also consider the
individual's prior experience as a professional journalist.97 The Ninth
Circuit, in von Bulow v. von Bulow,98 conceded that prior experience
would be "persuasive evidence of present intent" to satisfy the
requirement for claiming the privilege, but refused to accept it is the sine
qua non." Still, one of the primary reasons the court rejected the claim
for a privilege in von Bulow was that the individual had never published
anything under her own name and lacked either a contract with a
newspaper or a contract for her proposed book.' °°
Likewise, the Third Circuit in Titan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broadcasting
Systems, Inc. (In re Madden)'0 ' focused not just on the individual's intent
in seeking the information, but also on the fact that the individual
claiming the privilege received all of his information from wrestling
promoters.0 2  A competing wrestling promoter subpoenaed the
individual claiming the privilege as a nonparty witness in an unfair trade
practices action. 0 3 Despite the individual's claim to be "Pro Wrestling's
92. von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987).
93. Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1293; Titan Sports, Inc., 151 F.3d at 130.
94. Titan Sports, Inc., 151 F.3d at 129.
95. Id. at 131. The Titan Sports court held that a commentator who ran a 900-number
hotline on professional wrestling did not qualify for constitutional protection because, by
his own admission, he was an entertainer who was not gathering "news." Id. at 130.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
97. Compare Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1290 n.1 (emphasizing the individual's credentials as an
author of two previous investigative books), with von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 145 (considering
the absence of any prior publication and connection with traditional media as evidence
that individual did not have status as journalist to assert privilege).
98. 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir 1987).
99. Id. at 144.
100. Id. at 139-40, 145-46.
101. 151 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1998).
102. Id. at 130.
103. Id. at 126.
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only real journalist,"' ' the court determined that "hyperbolic self-
proclamation will not suffice as proof that an individual is a journalist."'0'5
The court determined that gathering and disseminating information
concerning "fictional wrestling characters" did not qualify as "news" and
therefore did not convey status as a "journalist" who qualifies for the
privilege.' °6
B. The Nature of the Journalistic Privilege at the State Level
1. Forty-nine States Recognize Some Form of a Privilege
In 1896, Maryland became the first state to enact a statute granting a
testimonial privilege to reporters. 1 7 The actions of the legislature came
on the heels of the jailing of a Baltimore Sun reporter, John Morris, for
not revealing to a grand jury the sources for his story about bribery of
public officials. 0 8 A series of similar cases occurred in other states before
the next state statute was enacted in 1933.1o9 More than thirty-five years
later, at the time of the Branzburg decision, only seventeen states had
statutes protecting journalists from revealing confidential sources.1' 0
However, by the summer of 2005, thirty-one states and the District of
104. Id. at 130 (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Act of Apr. 2, 1986, ch. 249, 1896 Md. Laws 437 (codified as amended at MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2002); Ervin, supra note 30, at 236.
The original statute only covered print journalists. See ch. 249, 1896 Md. Laws at 437. The
statute was later amended to include radio and TV reporters. Act of Apr. 29, 1949, ch.
614, 1949 Md. Laws 1477-78 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 9-112 (LexisNexis 2002).
108. See Tofani v. State, 465 A.2d 413, 415 (Md. 1983) ("His article contained
information practically identical to testimony received earlier by a grand jury investigating
such corruption. Suspecting a leak, the grand jury summoned Morris and demanded to
know his source. When he refused, he was imprisoned; he was released when the grand
jury's term expired some five days later. The Journalist's Club, alarmed at the prospect of
reporters having to choose between freedom and revealing the names of confidential
sources, persuaded the General Assembly to enact protective legislation."); see also Bruce
L. Bortz & Laurie R. Bortz, "Pressing" Out the Wrinkles in Maryland's Shield Law for
Journalists, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 461, 461-62 (1979) (describing the imprisonment of Morris
and the subsequent lobbying efforts for the nation's first shield law).
109. Ervin, supra note 30, at 236; Nathan Siegel, Op-Ed, Our History of Media
Protection, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2005, at A17 ("10 reporters in several states were jailed
for periods ranging from one to six weeks for refusing to disclose sources to grand juries.
One of them, a New York Tribune reporter who wrote a story about customs smugglers,
lost the first attempt to persuade appellate courts to recognize a 'reporter's privilege."').
110. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689 n.27 (1972). At the time of the decision,
the states that provided a statutory privilege for journalists were: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Id.
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Columbia had enacted statutory privileges for journalists,"' and another
eighteen states had recognized a common law privilege."' Only Hawaii
has explicitly rejected the existence of any privilege for reporters."'
2. Media Shield Laws
a. Scope of Privilege
States that enacted shield laws prior to Branzburg did so because
public policy required protection for members of the press from charges
of contempt. 14 However, the scope and coverage of the shield laws
varies."5 Some of the shield laws provide protection for all published and
111. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J.,
concurring).
112. Id.; see, e.g., State v. Salsbury, 924 P.2d 208, 213 (Idaho 1996); State v. Siel, 444
A.2d 499, 503 (N.H. 1982); Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broad. Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780, 782
(S.D. 1995).
113. In re Goodfader, 367 P.2d 472, 481-82 (Haw. 1961) (declining to create a privilege
for journalists because of the general rule requiring "'the disclosure of all information by
witnesses in order that justice may prevail"' absent action by the Legislature) (quoting
People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of N.Y. County, 199 N.E. 415, 416 (N.Y. 1936).
114. See, e.g., Beach v. Shanley, 465 N.E.2d 304, 308-09 (N.Y. 1984). The words of
Governor Rockefeller of New York reflect New York's reasons for passing the law:
Freedom of the press is one of the foundations upon which our form of
government is based. A representative democracy, such as ours, cannot exist
unless there is a free press both willing and able to keep the public informed of
all the news.
The threat to a newsman of being charged with contempt and of being
imprisoned for failing to disclose his information or its sources can significantly
reduce his ability to gather vital information.
Governor's Memoranda on Bills Approved, in NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL
472, 508 (1970).
115. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (LexisNexis 2002) ("No reporter,
former reporter or editorial employee of any newspaper, periodical or press association or
employee of any radio or television station may be required to disclose any published or
unpublished information obtained or prepared by such person in such person's
professional capacity in gathering, receiving or processing information for communication
to the public, or the source of any information procured or obtained by such person, in any
legal proceedings, trial or investigation: 1. Before any court, grand jury, coroner's inquest,
jury or any officer thereof. 2. Before the legislature or any committee thereof. 3. Before
any department, agency or commission of the state. 4. Before any local governing body or
committee thereof, or any officer of a local government."), with GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30
(1995) ("Any person, company, or other entity engaged in the gathering and dissemination
of news for the public through a newspaper, book, magazine, or radio or television
broadcast shall have a qualified privilege against disclosure of any information, document,
or item obtained or prepared in the gathering or dissemination of news in any proceeding
where the one asserting the privilege is not a party, unless it is shown that this privilege has
been waived or that what is sought: (1) Is material and relevant; (2) Cannot be reasonably
obtained by alternative means; and (3) Is necessary to the proper preparation or
presentation of the case of a party seeking the information, document, or item.").
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unpublished material. 16 Others provide protection only for confidential
information.1 7 Furthermore, some of the shield laws provide absolute
protection,"' although others only provide a qualified privilege. " 9
Finally, there is generally no protection for journalists if they are parties
to the action, for example in a defamation suit."O
These state shield laws, however, contain holes." ' For example,
California's shield law provides absolute protection from contempt
charges and is incorporated into the state's constitution.2 2 However, it
does not provide a privilege against testifying, and yields to conflicting
rights such as due process for criminal defendants.2 3 The inconsistent
manner in which the California courts have interpreted the shield law has
created unpredictability so that, as a practical matter, the shield law no
longer provides complete protection from compelled disclosure of
confidential news information.
24
b. Who Qualifies as a Journalist for the Privilege
The majority of the shield laws contemplate the connection between
the individual claiming the privilege and the traditional forms of media.25
For example, the California shield law provides protection for "[a]
publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed
116. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b)-(c)
(McKinney 1992).
117. Commonwealth v. Bowden, 838 A.2d 740, 748 n.6 (Pa. 2003) (holding that
Pennsylvania's shield law only protected compelled disclosure of confidential sources).
118. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2(b); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.275. New York's
statute provides "[a]bsolute protection for confidential news," but only "[q]ualified
protection for nonconfidential news." N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b)-(c) (McKinney
2002).
119. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119(2)-(3) (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30
(providing "qualified privilege against disclosure of any information, document, or item
obtained or prepared in the gathering or dissemination of news in any proceeding where
the one asserting the privilege is not a party"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (Supp. 2005).
120. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30; Brown v. Gatti, 99 P.3d 299, 309-10 (Or. Ct.
App. 2004) (holding that Oregon's shield law does not apply in defamation actions).
121. See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
122. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b).
123. Rancho Publ'ns v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 274, 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
State shield laws generally yield to the Sixth Amendment rights of defendants in criminal
cases. The Sixth Amendment provides "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation [and] to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
124. Rancho Publ'ns, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277 n.3.
125. See, e.g, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (LexisNexis 2000) (providing a
privilege for those individuals connected with a "noncommercial educational or
commercial radio broadcasting station" or those connected with a "noncommercial
educational or commercial television broadcasting station"); id. § 2739.12 (providing the
same protection to those working for newspapers and press associations).
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upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, or by a
press association or wire service. 1 26 The California law also protects
television and radio reporters and other people connected with or
employed by a television or radio station. 2 7 The Pennsylvania shield law,
by contrast, limits its protection to those engaged, connected, or
employed by a "newspaper of general circulation," press association,
radio or television station, or "magazine of general circulation.' ' 128
Other state shield laws define a journalist more generally based on the
process in which the individual is engaged. 129 The Michigan shield law,
for example, provides protection for a "reporter or other person who is
involved in the gathering or preparation of news for broadcast or
publication.' 3 Such shield laws are similar to the privilege at the federal
level because they leave it to a court's discretion to determine whether
the individual had the intent to publish or broadcast the information.13'
The court also may determine whether the information qualifies as
"news."
132
The New York shield law provides a third way for defining who is
afforded the privilege.' New York's shield law provides very explicit
definitions of "newspaper,', 34  "magazine,', 35  "news
126. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2(b).
127. Id.; see also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (LexisNexis 2002) (extending
protection to reporters, former reporters, and editorial employees of newspapers,
periodicals, and press associations as well as employees of radio and television stations).
128. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(a) (West 2000). The limitation of the protection
to newspapers and magazines of "general circulation" appears to be a direct consequence
of Justice White's concern that creation of the privilege would allow individuals to setup
fake newspapers to enable criminal activity that would be free from grand jury
investigations. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 n.40 (1972).
129. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(a) (2000) (extending the privilege to "[a]
person engaged in gathering information for publication or broadcast connected with or
employed by the news media or press, or who is independently engaged in gathering
information for publication or broadcast").
130. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a(1) (West 2000).
131. Cf Titan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. (In re Madden), 151 F.3d 125, 130
(3d Cir. 1998) (focusing on process and intent to analyze whether someone qualifies as a
journalist); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); von Bulow v. von
Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1987) (same).
132. Schauer, supra note 7, at 1279 n.100.
133. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(a) (McKinney 1992).
134. Id. § 79-h(a)(1) ("'Newspaper' shall mean a paper that is printed and distributed
ordinarily not less frequently than once a week, and has done so for at least one year, and
that contains news, articles of opinion (as editorials), features, advertising, or other matter
regarded as of current interest, has a paid circulation and has been entered at United
States post-office as second-class matter.").
135. Id. § 79-h(a)(2) ("'Magazine' shall mean a publication containing news which is
published and distributed periodically, and has done so for at least one year, has a paid
circulation and has been entered at a United States post-office as second-class matter.").
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agency,"' 13 6 "professional journalist,"'37 "newscaster,"' 38 and "news."'
39
Despite the explicit nature of the definitions, the definition of
"professional journalist" seems to allow an individual to invoke the
privilege, without a connection to traditional media forms, depending on
the process and intent of the individual.
40
C. The First Blogger Case
The first case to involve bloggers claiming a journalistic privilege was a
result of Apple Computer's attempt to uncover the source of a leak of
trade secrets.' 4' Apple subpoenaed the e-mail service providers of
websites that hosted blogs in which trade secret information about new
Apple products had been leaked. 142 Apple sought "the identity of any
person .. .who supplied information regarding an unreleased Apple
product."141
Several non-party bloggers claiming protection under California's
media shield law moved for a protective order blocking the subpoena.
144
The California Superior Court found it unnecessary to determine
whether the bloggers met the definition of a journalist to qualify for
protection because the court determined that the bloggers violated valid
criminal trade secret laws. 15 However, the court suggested it would not
136. Id. § 79-h(a)(3) ("'News agency' shall mean a commercial organization that
collects and supplies news to subscribing newspapers, magazines, periodicals and news
broadcasters.").
137. Id. § 79-h(a)(6) ("'Professional journalist' shall mean one who, for gain or
livelihood, is engaged in gathering, preparing, collecting, writing, editing, filming, taping or
photographing of news intended for a newspaper, magazine, news agency, press
association or wire service or other professional medium or agency which has as one of its
regular functions the processing and researching of news intended for dissemination to the
public; such person shall be someone performing said function either as a regular
employee or as one otherwise professionally affiliated for gain or livelihood with such
medium of communication.").
138. Id. § 79-h(a)(7) ("'Newscaster' shall mean a person who, for gain or livelihood, is
engaged in analyzing, commenting on or broadcasting, news by radio or television
transmission.").
139. Id. § 79-h(a)(8) ("'News' shall mean written, oral, pictorial, photographic, or
electronically recorded information or communication concerning local, national or
worldwide events or other matters of public concern or public interest or affecting the
public welfare.").
140. See id. § 79-h(a)(6).
141. Apple Computer Inc. v. Doe, No. 1-04-CV-032178, 2005 WL 578641, at *1-2, 74
U.S.P.Q.2d (B.N.A.) 1191, 1192-93 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2005); see also Marc L.
Greenwald & Emily B. Costello, Intersection of Trade Secret Protection, Reporter's
Privilege in New York, N.Y.L.J., July 5, 2005, at 4.
142. Apple Computer, 2005 WL 578641, at *1, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1192.
143. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
144. Id. at *1-2, 1192-93.
145. Id. at *7, 1197.
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have qualified the bloggers as journalists.46 The judge indicated that the
important factor to consider was the nature of the information being
published by the bloggers' 47 After examining this factor, the court found
that the bloggers put the information on their websites "with essentially
no added value. 1 48 The Court's decision signifies that a blogger seeking
status as a journalist must disseminate something more than reproduced
information obtained from others.
149
I. THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK REQUIRES
ACTION
A. The Supreme Court is Unlikely to Revisit Branzburg
To the extent that the Branzburg majority relied on "the great weight
of authority" to limit First Amendment protections, 150 some have
suggested that a constitutional privilege for journalists ought to be
revisited.' Others have criticized the weight afforded to Justice Powell's
146. Id. at *7 & n.7, 1197 & n.7.
147. Id. at *7 n.7, 1197 n.7.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J.,
concurring) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,685 (1972)).
151. See, e.g., id. Judge Tatel suggests that Branzburg was not dispositive of the
question whether a journalistic privilege exists. Id. Judge Tatel suggests that the
movement in the states to provide more protection for reporters could serve as a basis for
rethinking Branzburg in the same way that the Supreme Court had reconsidered the
understanding of "cruel and unusual punishment" regarding the execution of the mentally
retarded "based on a consensus among 'the American public, legislators, scholars, and
judges."' Id. (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306-07 (2002)). There is also
movement internationally to provide protection for reporters. See Goodwin v. United
Kingdom, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 484, 500 (1996) (holding that "[p]rotection of journalistic
sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom .... Without such protection,
sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of
public interest. As a result the vital public-watchdog role of the press may be undermined
and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely
affected."); see also Amit Mukherjee, International Protection of Journalists: Problem,
Practice, and Prospects, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 339, 344 (1994). In 2002, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia unanimously held that war
correspondents, under certain circumstances, could not be compelled to testify.
Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal,
50 (Dec. 11, 2002); see also Kelly Buchanan, Freedom of Expression and International
Criminal Law: An Analysis of the Decision to Create a Testimonial Privilege for
Journalists, 35 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 609, 614-16 (2004). Although it provided a
two-pronged test for determining when war correspondents could be subpoenaed, the
Tribunal provided no guidance to determine who would qualify as a journalist for the
privilege. Brdjanin at 9I 50; see also Anastasia Heeger, Securing a Journalist's Testimonial
Privilege in the International Criminal Court, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 209, 212 (2005)
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concurring opinion in Branzburg over the years because he joined the
majority in holding that there was no First Amendment protection.
1 52
Justice White's opinion was not a plurality opinion and therefore Justice
Powell's concurrence could neither limit nor expand upon the majority's
holding.
53
The argument for revisiting Branzburg is that there exists a great deal
of uncertainty among the circuits as to who has status to claim the
journalist's privilege14 and as to what types of proceedings a journalist
may claim the privilege.' Under the current system, a blogger working
for the Washington Post or National Review would have status as a
journalist to claim the privilege in the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits
against disclosure of confidential information. 6 However, an individual
(advocating that the International Criminal Court alter its evidentiary rules to provide a
qualified privilege for journalists).
152. See In re Miller, 397 F.3d at 971-72 ("Justice Powell's concurring opinion was not
the opinion of a justice who refused to join the majority. He joined the majority by its
terms, rejecting none of Justice White's reasoning on behalf of the majority .... If Justice
Powell in any way meant to afford more protection than was afforded by the rest of the
majority, that protection cannot possibly extend to appellants .... "); Storer Commc'ns v.
Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580, 585-86 (6th Cir. 1987) ("It is readily
apparent, then, that Justice Powell's concurring opinion is entirely consistent with the
majority opinion, and neither limits nor expands upon its holding, but that, instead, it
responds to what Justice Powell perceived as an unwarranted characterization of that
holding by Justice Stewart. Perhaps Justice Powell's use of the term 'privilege' has
provided too great a temptation for those inclined to disagree with the majority opinion.
In the sense that the balancing referred to by Justice Powell, when instigated by a reporter
seeking to protect a confidential source, may result in the denial to a party of the use of
evidence which is reliable, one is reminded of the invocation of a 'privilege,' as contrasted
with an 'exclusion' which prohibits the introduction of evidence which is unreliable or
calculated to mislead or prejudice. But, this balancing of interests should not then be
elevated on the basis of semantical confusion, to the status of a first amendment
constitutional privilege.").
153. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring); Storer Commc'ns, Inc.,
810 F.2d at 585.
154. See Clay Calvert, And You Call Yourself a Journalist?: Wrestling With a
Definition of "Journalist" in the Law, 103 DICK. L. REV. 411, 414 (1999) (noting the irony
"that the threshold question of whether a person who claims to be a journalist really is a
journalist for the purpose of asserting the reporter's privilege is seldom explored by
courts"); Kraig L. Baker, Comment, Are Oliver Stone and Tom Clancy Journalists?
Determining Who Has Standing to Claim the Journalist's Privilege, 69 WASH. L. REV. 739,
740 (1994) ("There is little case law that discusses who, beyond the traditional media, is
covered by journalists's privilege.").
155. See, e.g., United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1180-81 (1st Cir.
1988) (recognizing First Amendment limits on criminal defense subpoenas directed at
news organizations). But see Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T, 593
F.2d 1030, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Good faith [criminal] investigation interests always
override a journalist's interest in protecting his source.") (emphasis omitted).
156. See von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987) (acknowledging
that the court will look at an individual's prior experience as a professional journalist for
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with no history of working for traditional media outlets and publishing
exclusively on a website could not claim status as a journalist for
protection in any circuit, unless his or her purpose is to disseminate the
information to the public.'
There is also an argument that the Department of Justice guidelines,
which the Branzburg majority looked upon so favorably,"" have failed to
rectify the problem of subpoenaing members of the media.'59 Although
Justice White predicted that the Department of Justice guidelines for
subpoenaing media witnesses could eliminate the problem in the
future,'60 the problem of subpoenaing journalists continues as journalists•- 161
continue to face sanctions for refusing to testify. One of the main
problems with the guidelines has been that they provide no legal
recourse for members of the media who believe a prosecutor has abused4" .• 162
his discretion. Lower courts have consistently held that "the guidelines
. . . do 'not create or recognize any legally enforceable right in any
person.' , 1 63
traditional media when considering whether the individual qualifies for privilege); supra
text accompanying notes 96-100. Protection from compelled disclosure under California's
shield law has been extended to a reporter working for an online news provider. See
David Noack, Microsoft Won't Get Reporter's Notes: Judge Rules Against Software Giant's
Pursuit of CNet Reporter, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Mar. 27, 1999, at 14.
157. Cf. von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 145 (concluding that the individual's lack of a contract
for publication of manuscript prohibited her from claiming journalistic privilege to protect
her from producing subpoenaed notes and documents).
158. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707 & n.41.
159. See Neubauer, supra note 8, at 185 (claiming that overzealous United States
Attorneys ignored, from the beginning, the requirements that the Attorney General must
approve all subpoenas); see also The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
Special Report: Reporters and Federal Subpoenas, http://www.rcfp.org/shields-and_
subpoenas.html (last visited June 26, 2006) (describing the numerous current legal
controversies between prosecutors and journalists). "Of eleven subpoenas requested by
the Justice Department from August 1970 to October 1972, five were never approved by
the Attorney General." Neubauer, supra note 8, at 185 (citing Newsmen's Privilege
Legislation: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.
578-80 (1973) (memorandum of the U.S. Justice Department). The trend continued
between March 1973 and May 1975 when twenty-two "[o]f [the] 76 subpoenas requested
by the Justice Department against news personnel .. .were never approved by the
Attorney General." Neubauer, supra note 8, at 185-86 (citing Robert Walters, Sharing the
News With Justice, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept.-Oct. 1975, at 18).
160. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707.
161. See The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, supra note 159.
162. Neubauer, supra note 8, at 185; see also 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2004) (providing only
for what prosecutors may and may not do).
163. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 975 (D.C. Cir.)
(quoting 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(n)), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005); In re Special
Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44 n.3 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that the Department of Justice
guidelines state that they do not create legally enforceable rights). The enactment of the
guidelines was not required by any constitutional provision or statute. Id. The guidelines
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Still, some commentators praise the guidelines as a "shadow federal
shield law" that has been effective in protecting journalists.'
6 4
However, the Supreme Court is unlikely to revisit Branzburg and
establish a constitutional privilege for journalists because the Court has
resisted opportunities to do so in the past.' 65 Although there may have
been a shift in the "great weight of authority,"'' 66 the strict
constructionists on the Court, vociferous critics of relying on anything
beyond the text of the Constitution, are highly unlikely to recognize the
existence of a journalist's privilege. 67
B. State Shield Laws Do Not Provide Sufficient Protection
Although many states responded to the Branzburg decision by
enacting their own shield laws to protect journalists, some state shield
laws do not provide as much protection to journalists as it may appear.168
For example, the California Supreme Court proclaimed in Mitchell v.
Superior Court169 that the California shield law, which provides
journalists absolute immunity from contempt,17  granted news
organizations "virtually absolute protection against compelled
exist merely to direct the Department of Justice when it excercises its discretion to
determine whether to subpoena reporters and other media personnel. See United States
v. Long (In re Shain), 978 F.2d 850, 853 (4th Cir. 1992). But see In re Grand Jury
Subpoena of Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358, 370-71 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (relying on prosecutor's
failure to abide by the guidelines as reason for quashing subpoena), affd, 963 F.2d 567 (3d
Cir. 1992).
164. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The Hidden Federal Shield Law: On the Justice
Department's Regulations Governing Subpoenas to the Press, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 227,
236 (1999) (describing the guidelines as "sensible, rigorous, and predictable," and arguing
that "the Justice Department should be commended for bearing the self-imposed burdens
presented by the regulations").
165. See, e.g., Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726-27 (5th Cir. 1980)
(allowing the plaintiff to discover the identity of a confidential source where the
informant's identity was the only way the plaintiff could establish malice), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1041 (1981).
166. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (discussing change in state and
international courts).
167. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(chastising the majority for relying on the "'national consensus"' and the "'world
community"' rather than the text of the Eighth Amendment to determine that the
execution of mentally ill convicts constituted cruel and unusual punishment). The
likelihood of Branzburg being revisited is further diminished by the changed complexion
of the Court since the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist and retirement of Justice
O'Connor. See Peter Baker, Alito Nomination Sets Stage for Ideological Battle, WASH.
POST, Nov. 1, 2005, at Al.
168. See Timothy L. Alger, Comment, Promises Not to Be Kept. The Illusory
Newsgatherer's Privilege in California, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 155, 161 (1991).
169. 690 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1984).
170. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2(b).
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disclosure."'' However, lower courts in California and commentators
have called into question the California Supreme Court's assessment
because the shield law provides news organizations no protection from
other penalties for failing to testify and "yields to other conflicting rights
in appropriate circumstances, including the due process rights of criminal
defendants." 7 2
Much of the problem stems from the tension that shield laws create
between the legislative and judicial branches.'73 The Supreme Court was
concerned that a reporter's privilege would obstruct grand jury
investigative proceedings by preventing grand juries from obtaining
relevant evidence.174 As a result, courts have interpreted state shield
statutes narrowly.175 In criminal proceedings, courts have found that the
Sixth Amendment rights of the accused trump any state statute
protecting journalists from testifying. 7 6 There is also a history of tension
between some judges, who feel undermined by journalists who insist
their constitutional rights trump judicial orders.
17 7
171. Mitchell, 690 P.2d at 628.
172. See, e.g., Rancho Publ'ns v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 274, 277 & n.3 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1999) (contending that with all the exceptions and limitations to the shield law, it
could hardly provide the absolute protection from forced disclosure claimed by the
Supreme Court in Mitchell); Alger, supra note 168, at 161 (claiming that courts have
applied the law so inconsistently that "[o]nly an omniscient reporter could know
prospectively when he or she agrees to keep a secret whether, and in what kind of
proceeding, he or she will be subpoenaed").
173. See State v. Jascalevich (In re Farber), 394 A.2d 330, 343-44 (N.J. 1978)
(Pashman, J., dissenting).
174. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (noting that "the
longstanding principle that 'the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence' is
particularly applicable to grand jury proceedings" (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339
U.S. 323,331 (1950))).
175. See Neubauer, supra note 8, at 169.
176. See Jascalevich, 394 A.2d at 337 (holding that the testimonial privilege created by
New Jersey's shield law yielded to Sixth Amendment protections for compulsory process);
People v. Ramos, 101 P.3d 478, 501 (Cal. 2004) (observing that "'a newsperson's
protection under the shield law must yield to a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
a fair trial when the newsperson's refusal to disclose information would unduly infringe on
that right."' (quoting Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 937 (Cal. 1990))). But see
Jascalevich, 394 A.2d at 343-44 (Pashman, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the shield law
"reflects our Legislature's judgment that an uninhibited news media is more important to
the proper functioning of our society than is the ability of either law enforcement agencies,
the courts or criminal defendants to gain access to confidential news data.").
177. See Rosen, supra note 11, at 30-31 (explaining that some of the reporters
convicted of contempt "had little or no role in reporting the story" in question). Rosen
provided State v. Neulander, 801 A.2d 255 (N.J. 2002), as an example of a case where such
tension existed. Rosen, supra note 11, at 30-31. The state shield law was not in question,
but the Neulander court reversed the contempt convictions of the Philadelphia Inquirer
reporters who published an article identifying the forewoman of a jury in violation of the
judge's orders not to identify jury members. Id. According to Rosen, at the contempt
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A blogger without connections to traditional media outlets could be
protected under statutes that define journalists broadly, such as
Michigan's, which extends protection to "[a] reporter or other person
who is involved in the gathering or preparation of news for broadcast or
publication.. 78  However, such a general statute permits a court to
interpret whether the blogger falls within the category of journalists to be
protected and therefore provides no guarantee to a blogger that he will
be able keep a promise of confidentiality.9 Independent bloggers would
have no protection under a shield statute like Pennsylvania's, which
narrowly limits protection to those "engaged on, connected with, or
employed by any newspaper of general circulation or any press
association or any radio or television station, or any magazine of general
circulation." 8 °
It is somewhat less clear whether an independent blogger would
qualify for protection under the New York statute. 18 Although the New
York shield law provides an extensive definition of "professional
journalist,"'82 it leaves open whether an independent blogger could claim
protection under the provision that includes anyone working for any
"professional medium or agency which has as one of its regular functions
the processing and researching of news intended for dissemination to the
public....3
Regardless of whether bloggers are entitled to protection under state
shield laws, relying on the system of state shield laws to protect blogger-
hearing in Neulander, "[t]he tension between the judges, the reporters, and their counsel
was so palpable that at one point when a defense lawyer's motion was denied and he asked
to make his record, the judge actually left the courtroom while the attorney made his
remarks." Id.
178. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a(1) (West 2000); OR. REV. STAT. §
44.520(1) (2003) ("No person connected with, employed by or engaged in any medium of
communication to the public shall be required by a legislative, executive or judicial officer
or body, or any other authority having power to compel testimony or the production of
evidence, to disclose, by subpoena or otherwise .... ); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(a)
(2000) ("A person engaged in gathering information for publication or broadcast
connected with or employed by the news media or press, or who is independently engaged
in gathering information for publication or broadcast, shall not be required by a court, a
grand jury, the general assembly, or any administrative body, to disclose before the
general assembly or any Tennessee court, grand jury, agency, department, or commission
any information or the source of any information procured for publication or broadcast.").
179. Cf In re Stone, 397 N.W.2d 244, 246-48 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the
state shield law for "reporters of newspapers or other publications" did not apply to
broadcast media). The Michigan legislature subsequently amended the shield law to
include broadcast media. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a(1) (West 2000).
180. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (West 2000).
181. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b)-(c) (McKinney 1992).
182. Id. § 79-h(a)(6).
183. Id.
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journalists is inadequate because state shield laws provide little or no
help in federal proceedings.s4 Although a reporter may be certain that
his promise of confidentiality will be protected under state law at least in
some states, there is no certainty that he can guarantee confidentiality if
he is subpoenaed in federal court."'
C. Congress Could Take Action
1. Codify the Journalist's Privilege in the Federal Rules of Evidence
At least one commentator has suggested that Congress should codify
the journalist's privilege in the Federal Rules of Evidence."" Although
the judiciary has the right to add, delete, or amend other rules of
evidence,18 7 "any . . . rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an
evidentiary privilege [must be] . .. approved by Act of Congress., 188
Currently, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not provide any specific
nonconstitutional privileges."9 The original draft of Rule 501 provided
nine specific nonconstitutional privileges, but did not include a privilege
for a reporter or journalist. 9  After outcry over the proposed privilege
rules, including those concerned that reporters were being denied a
privilege,' 91 the rule was revised to eliminate all the specific enumerated
privileges and left the federal courts to develop the law of privileges.9
It is unlikely that Congress will attempt to codify the law of privileges
again, particularly the journalistic privilege, because the first attempt
184. See Reporters' Privilege Legislation: An Additional Investigation of Issues and
Implications: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2005)
[hereinafter Reporter's Privilege Legislation Hearing] (testimony of Anne Gordon,
Philadelphia Inquirer), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1637&
wit id=4701.
185. Id.
186. Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance- Testimonial Privileges
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 808 (2002).
187. Id. at 777-78.
188. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000); see also Broun, supra note 186, at 778 ("The judiciary,
including the United States Supreme Court, may suggest new privilege rules, but any such
rule would have to be adopted by Congress rather than simply allowed to come into
existence as is the case with other rules of evidence.").
189. See FED. R. EVID. 501; H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 8 (1973); S. REP. No. 93-1277, at
11 (1974).
190. Broun, supra note 186, at 772-73; H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 8; S. REP. No. 93-1277,
at 11.
191. Broun, supra note 186, at 776; see Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearing Before the
Spec. Subcomm. on Reform of Fed. Criminal Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong. 368 (1973) [hereinafter Proposed Rules of Evidence Hearing].
192. Broun, supra note 186, at 777.
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drew tremendous opposition from academics93 and "[c]urrent and
former members of the judiciary.', 9 4 Although the codification of the
Federal Rules of Evidence was controversial in itself,'95 the "chair of the
subcommittee that held hearings on the . . . rules, commented that '50
percent of the complaints in our committee related to the section on
privileges."
196
2. Enact a Federal Shield Law
The uncertainty surrounding the journalistic privilege at the federal
level has led some commentators to suggest that a federal shield law
should be enacted to protect the press. 97 During the six-year period
following the Branzburg decision, Congress witnessed the introduction of
close to one hundred proposed federal statutes to protect journalists.'
The failure of these bills was partially a result of Congress' "inability to
reach consensus on the definition of a 'journalist' and ... the insistence
of the press on an absolute privilege, not a qualified one."' 99 It was also
193. Id. at 773-74 & n.34 (citing Darrell W. Dunham, Testimonial Privileges in State
and Federal Courts: A Suggested Approach, 9 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 26 (1973); Jack H.
Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27
STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal
Courts. An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61 (1973);
Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: New
Perspectives, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 594 (1974)).
194. Proposed Rules of Evidence Hearing, supra note 191, at 263-64 (statement of
Henry J. Friendly, C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) (criticizing the
concept of evidence rules in general and privilege rules in particular); Proposed Rules of
Evidence Hearing, supra note 191, at 156 (testimony of Arthur J. Goldberg, Former
Supreme Court J.) (doubting Congress' authority to enact a code of evidence that
"extends to rules of privilege").
195. See Broun, supra note 186, at 769; see also Weinberg, supra note 193, at 594.
196. Broun, supra note 186, at 774 (quoting A Bill to Establish Rules of Evidence for
Certain Courts and Proceedings: Hearing on H.R. 5643 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 6 (1974) (testimony of Rep. William L. Hungate).
197. See Robert Zelnick, Journalists and Confidential Sources, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 541, 552 (2005) (calling for the press "to unite behind a sensible
federal shield law" that would protect confidentiality "except where one seeking access to
the information can establish that it is highly relevant and material to the issue at hand, it
cannot be obtained from any other source, it engages important societal values, and it
clearly serves the interests of justice"); Alexander, supra note 15, at 131-32 (proposing a
statute that would include journalists connected to non-traditional media); Neubauer,
supra note 8, at 192 (advocating a federal statutory solution to the problem of the
journalist's privilege); Ervin, supra note 30, at 267 (explaining the evolution of his position
from believing that courts should develop a journalist's privilege to supporting the
enactment of a federal shield law).
198. Berger, supra note 16, at 1391.
199. Id.
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the result of opposition from the American Bar Association 00 and
influential members of the media.' Currently, there are two bills before
Congress which would create a federal shield law.202 However, only the
Free Speech Protection Act of 2005, because of its broad definition of
news media, contemplates protection of bloggers not connected to
traditional media outlets. 3
The Branzburg decision certainly left open the possibility that
Congress could fashion a shield law in the future. 2  It would not be the
200. MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
MASS MEDIA LAW 626 (4th ed. 1990). "[T]he House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association voted 157-122 to reject the proposition that a reporter's privilege is essential
'to protect the public interest ... in the free dissemination of news and information to the
American people on matters of public importance."' Id. (quoting Report of the Study
Group on Journalists' Shield Law Legislation, in 99 REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 216 (1978)).
201. FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 200, at 626. Both the chairman of the board
of the Washington Post Company, Katherine Graham, and the editorial chairman of the
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, John Knight, believed that a shield law 'would compromis[e]
basic constitutional rights' of journalists. See id. (quoting Dan Paul, Why a Shield Law?,
29 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 459, 459 (1975)).
202. See Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, S. 1419. 109th Cong. (2005); Free Flow
of Information Act of 2005, H.R. 3323, 109th Cong. (2005); Free Speech Protection Act of
2005, S. 369, 109th Cong. (2005). The Free Flow of Information Act, introduced in both
the House and Senate, are awaiting committee hearings in their respective chambers. The
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, supra note 159. The House bill is
sponsored by Representative Mike Pence (R-Ind.) and Representative Rick Boucher (D-
Va.), while the Senate bill is sponsored by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.). Id. The
Pence and Lugar bills would provide an absolute privilege for confidential sources that
could only be overcome by "an imminent threat to national security." S. 1419, §
2(a)(3)(A); H.R. 3323, § 2(a)(3)(A). A party seeking other information from a reporter
would have to demonstrate by "clear and convincing evidence" that he had been unable to
obtain the information from other witnesses. S. 1419, § 2(a)(1); H.R. 3323, § 2(a)(1); The
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, supra note 159. The bill would only cover
persons working for traditional media outlets, and would provide no protection for
freelance journalists without a contract or journalists publishing solely on the Internet.
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, supra note 159; see also S. 1419, §
5(2); H.R. 3323, § 5(2). The other bill in the Senate sponsored by Sen. Christopher Dodd
(D-Conn.), S. 369, would provide essentially the same protection as the Lugar and Spence
bills, but would "provide[] coverage to a wider class of journalists." The Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, supra note 159; see S. 369, § 2. The Dodd bill would
extend coverage to a person who "(A) engages in the gathering of news or information;
and (B) has the intent, at the beginning of the process of gathering news or information, to
disseminate the news or information to the public." S. 369, § 2(1); The Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, supra note 159. The proposed law would even cover
"Web-only news sites." The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, supra note
159.
203. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, supra note 159.
204. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972) ("Congress has freedom to
determine whether a statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to
fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil
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first time that Congress responded to an unfavorable Court decision
against the press by enacting a law that limited the application of the
Court's decision. For example, in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the
Supreme Court held that a newspaper could not claim any First
Amendment protection to prevent the government from searching its
offices pursuant to a search warrant.21 Congress responded by enacting
the Privacy Protection Act of 1980,207 prohibiting the government from
using search warrants against the press when the press was not the
subject of the criminal investigation.2 °8 The law provides a civil cause of
action for damages against the federal government for not less than
$1,000.2o9 The law was enacted pursuant to Congress' constitutional
powers under the Commerce Clause.21°
The idea that Congress could use its powers under the Commerce
Clause to enact a federal shield law to protect journalists is not new.2 11
Congress has treated the "gathering and dissemination of news as part of
interstate commerce... to place the media under controls with respect to
labor relations and anti-competitive activities., 21 2 In fact, the original
proposed shield law following Branzburg would have applied to both
federal and state proceedings.2 3
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the federal government
has the authority to regulate broadcast radio and television.2 4 With the
increasing consolidation of the telecommunications industry into "media
hybrids" that deliver telephone, cable television, and internet access,
Congress has an even greater need and authority to provide regulation to
discerned and, equally important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time
may dictate.").
205. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
206. Id. at 565-68. The Court rejected the District Court's adoption of a "per se rule
forbidding [the government from conducting searches of a third-party newspaper by]
search warrant and permitting only subpoena[s] duces tecum." Id. at 563, 567-68.
207. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to 2000aa-12 (2000).
208. Id. § 2000aa(a) ("Notwithstanding any other law, it shall be unlawful for a
government officer or employee, in connection with the investigation or prosecution of a
criminal offense, to search for or seize any work product materials possessed by a person
reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book,
broadcast, or other similar form of public communication, in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce.").
209. Id. § 2000aa-6(f).
210. See id. § 2000aa(a); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
211. Neubauer, supra note 8, at 187.
212. Id. (footnote omitted).
213. Id.; see also H.R. 5928, 93d Cong. § 1843 (1973).
214. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1969).
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protect the public's First Amendment interests. 215 Although the Supreme
Court has previously determined that the Internet lacks the invasive
character of broadcast television or radio to require regulation,"' the
changing nature of the Internet makes it more akin to television and
radio than to print media.1
2121
Even with the decisions in United States v. Lopez 2  and United States v.
Morrison,"' which have restricted Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause, a federal shield law could pass judicial muster.220 The gathering
and dissemination of news is an activity that has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce, 21 and therefore fits into the third category of
222
activities that Congress may regulate under Lopez. The gathering and
dissemination of news also satisfies the Morrison test 2 3 as a commercial
activity because the search for truth has been subjugated to the demand
224for profit. The changed nature of the institutional media from closely-
held family businesses to public corporations has made the media subject
to the "expectations of investors, analysts, and fund managers.
225
215. See Steven A. Bredice, Comment, Media Hybrids and the First Amendment:
Constitutional Signposts Along the Information Superhighway, 44 EMORY L.J. 213, 214-15
(1995),
216. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997).
217. See Rebecca L. Covell, Note, Problems with Government Regulation of the
Internet: Adjusting the Court's Level of First Amendment Scrutiny, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 777,
792-93 (2000).
218. 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
219. 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000).
22 See;-F---text accompanying notes 2211-27.
221. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 128-29 (1937).
222. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. The majority:
identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its
commerce power. First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.
Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce ....
Id. (citations omitted).
223. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12. The majority laid out four factors to consider in
determining whether a statute had a substantial relation to interstate commerce: (1) is the
regulated activity economic; (2) does the statute contain an "'express jurisdictional
element which might limit its reach to a discrete set' of circumstances; (3) does the statute
"'contain[] express congressional findings regarding the effects [of the activity] upon
interstate commerce'; (4) is the relation between the regulated activity and the
substantial effect "attenuated." Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562).
224. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 453-54.
225. See id. at 454; see also Frank A. Blethen, It's Going to Get Worse, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., May/June 2001, at 23 (noting that "[b]eing publicly traded means your
fiduciary responsibility is to maximize profits, which forces you to focus on short-term
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Journalism has become driven by the need to please advertisers in order
to make a profit as much as it is driven by a desire to inform the public.
2 26
Although journalism may have been considered a noneconomic activity
at one time, today it is certainly an economic activity that would qualify1 227
for congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause.
III. CONGRESS SHOULD ENACT A FEDERAL SHIELD LAW THAT WOULD
PROTECT BLOGGER-JOURNALISTS
Congress is the proper forum for determining the scope of the
journalist privilege to protect confidential sources. 26 The determinations
to be made about which individuals have status as journalists "do not
flow from constitutional principle[s]., 229 Relying on the courts to make
such determinations in this rapidly changing world of media will lock in
place decisions that are likely to "look quite foolish a few years later,"
when the circumstances leading to the decision have changed.230  State
legislatures have already shown the ability to craft "crisp" definitions in
decision-making" and limits newspapers' "ability to invest in original news content and
long-term reader connection").
226. See GILBERT CRANBERG ET AL., TAKING STOCK: JOURNALISM AND THE
PUBLICLY TRADED NEWSPAPER COMPANY 11-12 (2001) (finding that the need to please
advertisers has changed news "from information and opinion that is important to the
public to material that is preferred by a market"); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience
What it Wants, 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 311, 404-11 (1997) (lamenting the corrupting effects of
advertising); C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
2097, 2139-68 (1992) (declaring that because most of journalism is financially dependent
on advertising, journalism's job has become increasingly to deliver the type of audience an
advertiser is seeking to buy).
227. See supra note 225; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23-26 (2005)
(distinguishing the activities prohibited from congressional regulation in Lopez and
Morrison as non-economic). The production and distribution of news for consumption is
much closer to the production and distribution of drugs for consumption than it is to
protecting women from violence or protecting schoolchildren from guns. Cf id. Because
the Court has determined that it is permissible for Congress to regulate the intrastate
cultivation and production of drugs, it should follow that it is permissible for Congress to
also regulate newsgathering (insofar as newsgathering involves protecting journalists and
not interfering with First Amendment rights). Cf. id. It could be argued in the alternative
that journalism is the type of local intrastate activity that has such a profound effect on
interstate commerce that it calls for congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause.
Cf. id. at 2205-06 ("'[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts
a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."' (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 125 (1942))).
228. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 515 ("If the press is to receive preferential legal
treatment, it is generally preferable to give it by statute, regulation, and other
nonconstitutional means.").
229. Id.
230. Id. at 515-16.
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their own shield laws.23 ' There is no reason why Congress cannot do the
232
same.
However, the bills currently before Congress do not provide the
proper amount of protection for journalists. 2 3  The Free Flow of
Information Act of 2005 only provides qualified protection from a
federal entity compelling a reporter to produce information in "any
proceeding or in connection with any issue arising under Federal law.
34
A journalist would have no protection under the proposal if a party
235sought information through discovery in a diversity action. The bill
also fails to extend protection to an independent blogger who publishes
236exclusively on the Internet.
The Free Speech Protection Act of 2005, on the other hand, defines
237journalists too broadly. It incorporates a definition proposed by some
commentators that only looks at whether the individual claiming the
privilege is engaged in the journalistic process.238 Critics worry that such
a broad definition of journalist would not only protect any person who
sets up a blog, but would also apply to any individual employed by state-
239owned foreign news agencies hostile to America.
231. Schauer, supra note 7, at 1278 n.100 (asserting that the problem of defining
journalists is largely illusory when looking at existing journalist shield laws); see also 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(a) (West 2000).
232. Cf. Schauer, supra note 7, at 1278 n.100.
233. See Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, S. 1419, 109th Cong. (2005); Free
Speech Protection Act of 2005, S. 369, 109th Cong. (2005); supra text accompanying notes
202-03.
234. S. 1419, § 2.
235. See id.
236. See The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, supra note 159.
237. See id.; S. 369, § 2.
238. S. 369; see also, Alexander, supra note 15, at 130 (defining a journalist in proposed
statute as "any person who is engaged in gathering news for public presentation or
dissemination by the news media"); Berger, supra note 16, at 1404-06 (advocating the
protection of the journalistic process, as "defined as work that demonstrates a
commitment to regular and public dissemination of 'journalistic truth."').
239. See Reporters' Privilege Legislation Hearing, supra note 184, at 2-3 (statement of
Sen. John Cornyn, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("[A]s we consider what
protections to afford, it is also important to consider whether bloggers, or reporters for
entities such as al Jazeera, or others whose associations perhaps are questionable or even
cause for concern, ought to be covered under this type of law."); see also Reporters'
Privilege Legislation Hearing, supra note 184, at 2 (statement of Chuck Rosenberg, U.S.
Att'y for the Southern District of Texas, U.S. Dep't of Justice) ("[T]he Department [of
Justice] objects to the broad definition of 'covered person' in section 5(2) that, inter alia,
encompasses foreign media and foreign news agencies (including government-owned and
- operated [sic] news agencies), some of which are hostile to the United States and some
of which can, and have, acted in support of foreign terrorist organizations (a reporter of
the Qatarian news network AI-Jazeera was recently convicted in Spain for acting as a
financial courier for AI-Qaeda)").
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Congress should enact a federal shield law that applies to all
proceedings in federal courts. Although journalists might prefer a shield
law that applies to both federal and state proceedings, there would be too
much resistance to Congress "forc[ing] federal evidentiary rules upon
state courts., 240  At the state level, most journalists enjoy at least a
qualified privilege to protect confidential sources.4 ' Therefore, a federal
shield law should focus on protecting journalists, especially blogger-
journalists, in federal proceedings.
A proper federal shield law should explicitly define "news media,"
"journalist," and "news," such as those in the New York media shield
law, to clarify who has status to qualify for the journalistic privilege.242
To protect individuals who publish exclusively on the internet, the shield
law should define "media" as a "newspaper, magazine, news agency,
press association, wire service, radio or television station, online news
service or website which has as one of its primary functions the purpose
of disseminating news. 2 43  Similarly, the shield law should define
"journalist" as: "a person who for gain or livelihood, is engaged in
gathering, preparing, collecting, writing, filming, taping, or
photographing news intended for dissemination by media and the person
is professionally affiliated with the media disseminating the
information.",2" A blogger who charges a subscription fee or who is
under contract with an online news service would qualify for protection
because she would receive a monetary gain from her activities even if
245blogging is not her full-time job.
This proposed definition of journalist is a compromise between those
commentators who believe the law should protect the process of
journalism 246 and those who believe that the law should provide the
240. Cf Neubauer, supra note 8, at 187-88. In the alternative, the media could take
the proposed federal shield law and use it as a model statute to propose to state
legislatures in the same way that many states adopted the provisions of the Federal Rules
of Evidence and the Uniform Commercial Code. Using the state by state approach could
result in a uniform journalistic privilege at the state and federal level. However, the media
is unlikely to spend the time and money necessary to pass a uniform shield law in each
state because most journalists already enjoy at least some level of protection at the state
level. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
241. See discussion supra Part I.B.
242. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text (highlighting New York's
equivalent definitions).
243. Cf Free Speech Protection Act of 2005, S. 369, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
244. Cf. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(a)(6) (McKinney 1992).
245. See id. (requiring first that a journalist receive "gain or livelihood" for his or her
effort).
246. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 16, at 1404-06 (advocating that "the protected process
of journalism can be defined as work that demonstrates a commitment to regular and
public dissemination of 'journalistic truth"'). Berger's definition "relies ... on journalists'
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privilege only to the traditional media institutions. 4  The problem with
using the journalistic process to define who is protected by the privilege
is that bloggers do not adhere to the traditional journalistic process
24because they rely on their readers to serve the editorial role.   Such a
definition of journalist would be over-inclusive because it would protect
publishers of gossip and rumor who retract the false information they• • 241
publish only after readers complain . On the other hand, if a shield law
was to "carve up" the First Amendment to favor journalists tied to
traditional media institutions at the expense of blogger-journalists and
others operating in the "new media," it would be under-inclusive of
individuals who deserve the protection of the privilege. ° This proposed
definition would certainly leave some amateur bloggers providing
newsworthy information without protection; however, this unfortunate
consequence would be outweighed to the extent that such a definition
would satisfy those critics concerned about an overly broad journalistic
privilege.25
In addition, the federal shield law should distinguish between "news"
and other forms of journalism in limiting the information that is
protected from subpoena.2 2 Some commentators have criticized the
definitions of the values, standards, mission, and work practices of their profession." Id. at
1376.
247. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 15, at 135-36 (arguing for a limited approach to
the scope of the journalist's privilege to ensure that it remains viable for traditional
journalists); cf. Schauer, supra note 7, at 1276-78 (suggesting that the First Amendment
ought to provide special protections for certain types of institutions without providing any
evidence of what an institutional approach would took like).
248. See Berger, supra note 16, at 1415 (suggesting that bloggers may satisfy the
editorial function of traditional journalism by evaluating and responding to immediate
feedback from readers).
249. See Alexander, supra note 15, at 131 (rejecting a broad formulation for the
journalist's privilege because it "risk[s] doing great harm to the free flow of information
undergirding the concept of a journalist's privilege").
250. See Carpenter, supra note 23, at 1411 (cautioning that favoring individuals
connected to traditional media will create a bias favoring "mainstream institutions and
ideas at the expense of 'the poorly financed causes of little people"') (quoting Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943)).
251. See Reporters' Privilege Legislation Hearing, supra note 184, at 2-3 (statement of
Chuck Rosenberg, U.S. Att'y for the Southern District of Texas, U.S. Dep't of Justice);
Reporters' Privilege Legislation Hearing, supra note 184, at 1-2 (statement of Sen. John
Cornyn, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
252. See, N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(a)(8) (McKinney 1992) (defining "news" so it
is limited to "local, national, or worldwide events or other matters of public concern or
public interest or affecting the public welfare"); see also Gloria Borger, "Matt Drudge is
Not My Colleague", HARV. INT'L J. PREss/POL., Summer 1998, at 132, 133 ("Matt Drudge
is the gossip you hear around the watercooler[,] . . .not what you're reading ... on the
front page of the New York Times."); cf Janet Forgrieve, Net a Fret: Cronkite Says That's
Way It Is; Web Infested with People Pretending to be Journalists, Famed Newsman Says,
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inclusion of the term "news" in shield laws because they believe the
government should not evaluate what qualifies as news. 253 However, the
courts readily distinguish between other forms of speech under the First
Amendment; therefore, Congress and the courts should be able to
determine what is "news" and what is deserving of protection. 25 While
the gripe and gossip websites may enjoy some of the same characteristics
as Pulitzer Prize-winning reporting for the Washington Post, Congress
and the courts can draw lines between the two.255 The inclusion of the
term "news" into the shield law also alleviates the concerns of those who
fear the creation of sham media in order for criminals and terrorists to
256hide behind the shield law. It also mirrors the actions of what some
federal courts have already been doing in limiting who can qualify as a
journalist to be eligible to invoke the privilege.251
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress should take affirmative steps to protect journalists from
being used by the government in investigations by establishing a strong
shield law."' The Valerie Plame episode demonstrated, once again, that
the federal judiciary is unwilling to provide sufficient protection for
journalists from compelled disclosure of confidential information.2 5 9
Although the states have enacted shield laws of their own to protect
260journalists, they are insufficient. In addition, the varying standards
among the circuit courts of appeal as to what constitutes the qualified
ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver, Colo.), June 13, 2002, at 2B, available at 2002 WLNR
1096912 (reporting that Walter Cronkite believes the Internet is filled with individuals
posing as journalists who publish unsubstantiated rumors without fear of penalty).
253. See Berger, supra note 16, at 1410 ("[R]equiring that the end publication contain
a particular kind of content-whether it is defined as 'news' or information of legitimate
public concern -is both constitutionally suspect and unworkable.") (footnote omitted); see
also Anderson, supra note 16, at 529 ("In current First Amendment thought, the idea that
government has no business evaluating the importance of various kinds of speech is, if not
an article of faith, at least a strong presumption.").
254. Schauer, supra note 7, at 1263-64 (pointing out that the Supreme Court "readily
distinguishes incitement from advocacy, commercial speech from noncommercial speech,
obscenity from indecency, public interest speech from personal interest speech") (citations
omitted).
255. Carpenter, supra note 23, at 1408.
256. See, e.g., Reporters' Privilege Legislation Hearing, supra note 184, at 2 (statement
of Sen. John Cornyn, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
257. See Titan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. (In re Madden), 151 F.3d 125,
130 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that dissemination of information concerning fictional
wrestling characters did not constitute "news" to confer status on individual as journalist).
258. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
260. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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privilege create too much uncertainty for journalists pledging
confidentiality.261 Therefore, action on the federal level is necessary.
The Supreme Court is unlikely to act on the privilege issue; the Court
has consistently refused to revisit its decision in Branzburg to reject a
First Amendment privilege for journalists who refuse to provide
evidence to a grand jury 62 Although it has neglected to enact a shield
263law in the past, the more likely source of action is Congress. Congress
arguably has the authority pursuant to the Commerce Clause to enact a
federal shield law to protect journalists.26' However, the problem for
Congress will be determining which individuals qualify as journalists for
protection.2" The advent of the Internet and bloggers has made the job
of defining journalists much harder than in the past.266 While Congress
could limit its definition of journalists to individuals in the traditional
media, it will be doing a disservice to technology and progress if it
produces a federal shield law that does not protect individuals who
pursue the journalistic vocation exclusively online. 26' The line between
journalists and non-journalists on the Internet may not be easy to draw,
but Congress nevertheless must draw it. Blogger-journalists deserve to
be protected as much as journalists employed by the traditional media.
261. See supra Part II (discussing options that Congress can pursue to protect the
journalistic privilege in the absence of sufficient protection in the circuit courts and the
states).
262. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 211-27.
265. See supra notes 246-51 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
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